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Sophia on the web A Resource Guide for Philosophy Students Created by Jennifer Leslie Torgerson, MA This
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The Question of God & The Problem of Evil Bibliography Saint Anselm. The Prayers and Meditations, with the Proslogion.
(New York, NY: Penguin Books,
1973). Aquinas. Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas;
Robert P. Goodwin, Translator. (New
York, NY: MacMillan, 1965). Augustine. The Confessions. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1960). __________, The Essential Augustine; Vernon J.
Bourke, Editor. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1974 [1947]). __________, City of God. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984 [1972]). __________, Against the Academicians
and The Teacher. (Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett Publishing, 1995). Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1969). Peter Brown. Augustine of Hippo, A Biography. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969
[1967]). Martin Buber. Good and Evil. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner Sons, 1953 [1952]). __________, I and Thou. (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1958). Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy: Book One. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1985 [1944]). __________, A History of
Philosophy: Book Two. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1985 [1944]). __________, A History of
Philosophy: Book Three. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1985 [1944]). __________, Aquinas: An Introduction to the Life and Work of the
Great Medieval Thinker. (New York,
NY: Penguin Books, 1955). Johann Fichte. The Vocation of Man. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987
[1800]). Neil Gillman. Sacred Fragments: Recovering Theology for the Modern Jew. (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1992
[1990]). John Hick. Philosophy of Religion, Fourth
Edition. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990 [1963]). __________, The Existence of God. (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1964). __________, Classical and Contemporary
Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990 [1964]). __________, Evil and the
God of Love, Revised Edition. (New
York, NY: Harper Collins 1977 [1966]). David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals; J. B. Schneewind, Editor. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983). __________, Enquiries
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd
Edition; P. H. Nidditch, Editor. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995 [1902]). William James. The Varieties of Religious Experience. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1985 [1902]). W. T. Jones. A History of Western Philosophy: The Classical Mind, 2nd
Edition. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1980 [1952]). __________, A History of Western
Philosophy: The Medieval Mind, 2nd
Edition. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1980 [1952]). __________, A History of Western
Philosophy: Hobbes to Hume, 2nd
Edition. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1980 [1952]). __________, A History of Western
Philosophy: Kant and the Nineteenth
Century, 2nd Edition.
(San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace,
1980 [1952]). __________, A History of Western
Philosophy: The Twentieth Century to
Wittgenstein and Sartre, 2nd Edition. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1980 [1952]). Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Editor.
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books,
1990). __________, The One Possible Basis for
a Demonstration of the Existence of God.
(New York, NY: Bison Books,
1994 [1979]). SØren Kierkegaard, The Present Age. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1962). __________, Fear and Trembling. (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1985). Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Oration on the Dignity of Man. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery
Gateway, 1992
[1956]). Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, Basinger. Reason
& Religious Belief: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. Robert C. Solomon. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, 9th
Edition. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008). Christopher Stead. Philosophy in Christian Antiquity. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1994]). Ken Wilber, Editor. Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Greatest
Physicists. (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1985). NOTE: This topic has been limited to material
covered in my Introduction to Philosophy course only. This page does not represent everything
covered in my Philosophy of Religion course, which also includes topics of
comparative religion and the varieties of religious experience. Topics: Augustine and the Problem of
Evil Ontological argument for the
existence of God Faith and Reason as
compatible Cosmological argument for
the existence of God
The Teleological argument
for the existence of God
Augustine and the Problem of
Evil
St. Augustine (354- 430 CE) Biography
[material from (a) Great Traditions in Ethics, and (b) Copleston's A History of Philosophy] (a)
"St. Augustine lived in a crucial period in the history of Christianity:
in 313, the emperor Constantine granted liberty of worship to Christians, and
in 325 the Council of Nicaea defined the basic Christian doctrine, declaring
all other interpretations heretical. In the attempt to put down the heresies,
Saint Augustine was a powerful influence. He was born in Tagaste
(in the province of Numidia, on November 13th, A.D. 354), a small town in
North Africa. His mother, though not his father, was a Christian, and until
Augustine's conversion to Christianity in his thirty-second year, his life
followed the pattern of the typical young Roman provincial of the times.
However, his boyhood pranks, his pride in his proficiency in the schools of
the Roman rhetoricians, and his indulgence in sensual pleasure became a
source of self-reproach when he viewed them in retrospect as a mature man and
pious Christian. (b)
Before his conversion, Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric. During this phase
of his career, his philosophical position shifted several times in his search
for a satisfactory set of beliefs. He joined for a time the sect of Manichaeans, who explained the universe through the
dualistic doctrine of God (or Ormuzd) and Satan (or
an evil principle, that of darkness, Ahriman)
engaged in a struggle to dominate the world. Dissatisfied with their
answers to the questions which troubled him (for example, the problem of the
source of certitude in human thought, the reason why the two forces were in
eternal conflict, etc.), he turned to Greek philosophy and in particular
Neo-Platonism (Plotinus) (which freed him from the shackles of materialism
and to facilitate his acceptance of the idea of immaterial reality). Here he
met with no better success, although the Neo-Platonic teachings later stood
him in good stead. He rejected the pantheistic conception that the human soul
is part of the World-Soul, but incorporated in his own theory of knowledge
the Neo-Platonic doctrine that the ultimate in knowledge is a mystical
intuition of the Supreme Reality, which only a few can experience. Augustine
came at last under the influence of Saint Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, who
reinforced the efforts of the young man's mother, Monica, to turn to
Christianity. He had a decisive inner experience (hearing a child's voice
crying the repeated refrain Tolle lege! Tolle lege!
from over a wall, when he randomly looked into the
Bible and read the words of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, which
sealed his moral conversion) in (the summer) of 386, and he was then baptized
by Saint Ambrose the following year. Augustine
entered the priesthood in 391, rising in the course of time to become Bishop
of Hippo. He applied his great talent as a thinker and a writer of philosophy
to the study of the Holy Scriptures and other teachings of his new religion,
producing numerous works on Christian doctrine. His Confessions, while
they contain abundant autographical detail, are primarily a eulogy of God and
a declaration of devotion and love for Him. The City of God, on the other
hand, is an extensive philosophy of history in the framework of the Christian
religion, and its functions as an elaborate theodicy - a justification of the
ways of God to humans. The Enchiridion, a work of his later years, is
a manual in which he sets forth the meaning of the virtues of faith, hope,
and love. The clearest expression of Augustine's theory of knowledge is to be
found in the work, De Musica. His other
contributions to Christian philosophy and theology include: On the Nature
of God, On Free Will, On the Immortality of the Soul, On
Nature and Grace, and On the Trinity, The Teacher. Three
important examples of Augustine's adaptation of concepts from Greek
philosophy are: (1) the incorporation of Plato's conception of the
"Good" in the characterization of God, (2) the use of the
Neo-Platonic idea of the mediating function of the Logos (the Cosmic Reason,
or Divine Word), in interpreting the role of Jesus Christ in the Holy
Trinity, and (3) the use of the Neo-Platonic definition of evil as the
absence of good in the resolution to the "Problem of Evil". " The Problem of Evil With
a God which is: *
All good (omnibenevolent),
*
All knowing (omniscient), *
All powerful (omnipotent), and *
Knows the past/present/future at once or it is
all present (omnipresent), Why does evil exist in the
world in both moral and natural forms? God
is also transcendent, which means he transcends his creation, and our
experience, or God is beyond knowledge literally. Thus God is not literally omnipresent. Moral
evil: evil that results from personal depravity. (Murder, torture, evils
caused by man upon another man) Natural
evil: evil that results from natural causes (disease, deformity, natural
disasters, etc.) In
any case, evil is considered to be unnecessary suffering. But why doesn't God
eliminate this unnecessary suffering? Some Traditional Solutions
to the Problem of Evil (1)
Retributive justice: or payback Law
of retaliation (lex talionis) An
example of retributive justice is presented in Hittite treaties: a)
The parties involved. b)
History of relationship c)
New agreement (stipulations)
d)
Blessings and curses e)
Sealing ceremony, usually an animal sacrifice Genesis
Ch 15: Abram makes a treaty with God, to lead the nation of the Hebrews. (2)
Contrast theodicy: from the Greek, theos =
god, and dike = justice. Evil
exists so that you know what the good is (balance). How
much evil do you need? Just enough evil to contrast with the good. Some
suggest that there is too much evil in the world, but others disagree (such
as C.S. Lewis, 'the problem of pain'). But the sole reason of evil is so that
you know what the good is. (3)
Not enough evil to cause a "problem of evil" (again, C.S. Lewis,
and the 'problem of pain').
(4)
Free will defense: We
are free to choose good or evil. It is evidential that people will choose
evil. To some extent, we lost some free will when Adam and Eve choose to eat
the fruit of the tree of knowledge (Genesis). This is called Original Sin.
All men are tainted with this Original Sin, but through God's Grace
(Augustine); some are able to overcome Original Sin. Therefore, some
individuals are determined to be evil, since they do not have Divine Grace,
but still they are acting as God wills. (5)
Divine Plan: Evil
is just part of the big picture. If you could understand God's mind, then you
could understand the purpose of evil. Therefore, what is prima facie evil, or
what appears at first glance to be evil, is really part of God's plan. The Book of Job presents a good example of
this solution. (6)
God is finite: This
position is not supported by the Judeo-Christian concept of God, which
contends that God is infinite. Therefore this is not an adequate solution to
the Problem of evil, and of course, neither would claim that God is not truly
omnipotent. Any limit such limit placed upon God is contradictory to the
definition provided by Judeo-Christians. Evil can be explained without
compromising God's attributes. Augustine has explained this in his
Enchiridion. "For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of
God under necessity that if we should say that God should live forever, and
foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He
cannot die or fall into error, - for this is impossible to Him, that if it
were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly
called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is
called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His
suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no
means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason
that He is omnipotent." (BK V: 9-10). This is NOT A SOLUTION BUT
DISSOLUTION. Ontological argument for the
existence of God What
does 'to be' mean? Ontological arguments for the existence of God start with
a definition of God and then claim that God necessarily exists by definition.
Existence is part of the nature of God. Ontology is usually the study the
essential characteristics of Being in itself apart from the study of any
particular existing things. But there is only one God, so we must in this
instance study His particular Being. [ontos
= being in Greek]. Anselm's ontological
argument for the existence of God (from Proslogion,
Ch. 2) (1)
Now we believe that Thou are a being that which none greater can be thought. Or can it be that there is no
such being? (2)
For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another
thing to understand that it exists. (3)
But clearly, that than which a greater being cannot be thought cannot exist
in the understanding alone. (4)
For if it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought as
existing also in reality and this is greater. (5)
Therefore, if that which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding
alone, this same thing than which a greater being cannot be thought is that
than which a greater can be thought. (Contradiction) (6)
(Implication) Therefore there exists (without doubt) both in the
understanding and in reality something than which a greater cannot be
thought. Anselm's ontological
argument for God as Necessary Being (from Proslogion,
Ch. 3) (1)
And it certainly exists so truly that is cannot be thought of as nonexistent. (2)
For something can be thought of as existing, which cannot be thought of as
not existing, and this is greater than that which can be thought of as not
existing. (3)
Thus, is that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought of as not
existing, this very thing, that which a greater cannot be thought is not
that which a greater cannot be thought. But,
this is contradictory. (4)
So, then (by implication), there truly is a being that than which a greater
cannot be thought-- so truly it cannot even be thought of as not existing. To
see Descartes' version of the argument, go to the summary of the Third and Fifth Meditation of First Philosophy. In his Meditations on First Philosophy,
Descartes presents both a causal (Third Meditation) and an ontological (Fifth
Meditation) argument for the existence of God. Anselm has two difficulties (a)
Concluding that God exists in reality from the understanding of the concept
of God in thought - which predicates the 'fullness of perfection' (to use
Descartes' term) which includes existence, to the subject God, is invalid. As
Immanuel Kant (1724- 1802) said in his Critique of
Pure Reason, " 'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is,
it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a
thing, or of certain demonstrations, as existing themselves. Logically, it is
merely a copula (something that links together, i.e. verb) of a judgment. The
proposition, 'God is omnipotent,' contains two concepts, each of which has
its object- God and omnipotence. The
small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate
in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all
its predicates (among one is omnipotence), and say 'God is,' or 'There is
God,' we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an
object that stands in relation to my concept . [...] By whatever and by
however many predicates we may think a thing- even if we completely determine
it- we do not make the least addition to the thing which we further declare
that this thing is." Judgments
about existence cannot be merely analytic (S>P, all info. in P contained
in S), or tautological. Synthetic statements are used when making judgments
about existence (information in P goes beyond S). Synthetic judgments are
based on, or contingent upon experience, for verification. Therefore we cannot
just look into the meaning of the terms, analytically, to demonstrate
existence. We will discuss Kant's position in
more detail later in the course. (b)
Although we know the difference between having a concept in the understanding
and yet another for it to actually exist, Anselm thinks that God is a special
case, in that He is unlimited, therefore He cannot be limited in existence
either. To say that concept x correlates to being x out in the world, it is
contingent upon seeing x out in the world. God is not self-evident to our
limited perception (St. Thomas). (Self evident = the meaning of S is
contained in P). Therefore we cannot prove ontologically the existence
of God. Anselm also assumes that existence in reality is greater than
only knowing a concept in the understanding. Cardinal numbers do not exist in
reality, but are very beneficial. Anselm replies to the
objections From Reply to Gaunilo But
you say, suppose that someone imagined an island in the ocean, surpassing all
lands in its fertility. Because of the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility, of finding something that does not exist, it might as well be
called the "Lost Island." By reasoning like yours, he might then
say that we cannot doubt that it truly exists in reality, because anyone can
easily conceive it from a verbal description. I state confidently that if
anyone discovers something for me, other than that "than which a greater
cannot be thought," existing either in reality, or in thought alone, to
which the logic of my argument can be applied, I shall find his lost island
and give it to him, never to be lost again. But it now seems obvious that
this being than which none greater can be thought cannot be thought of as
non-existent, because it exists by such a sure reason of truth. For otherwise
it would not exist at all. In short, if anyone says that he thinks this, he
thinks of something than which a greater cannot be thought, or he does not
think. 1135-1204 Maimonides was born in
Cordova Spain, but later settled in Egypt (1165). Maimonides was a
rabbinic scholar, a philosopher, and a physician. His Guide for the
Perplexed was written in Arabic in 1190. It was written to help
Jews who were perplexed by conflicting claims of religion and philosophy.
Maimonides shows the importance of negative attributes of God (such as
he is not finite). Faith and Reason as
compatible Thirteen
Principles of Faith 1.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, is the Creator
and Ruler of all created beings, and that he alone has made, does make, and
ever will make all things.
2.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, is One; that
there is no oneness in any form like his; and that he alone was, is, and will
ever be our God. 3.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, is not corporeal;
that no bodily accidents apply to him; and that there exists nothing whatever
that resembles him. 4.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, was the first
and will be the last. 5.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, is the only one
to whom it is proper to address our prayers, and that we must not pray to
anyone else. 6.
I firmly believe that all that words of the Prophets are true. 7.
I firmly believe that the prophecy of Moses our teacher, may he rest in
peace, was true; and that he was the chief of the prophets, both of those who
proceeded and of those that followed him. 8.
I firmly believe that the whole Torah which we now possess is the same
which was given to Moses our teacher, may he rest in peace. 9.
I firmly believe that this Torah will not be changed, and that there
will be no other Torah given by the Creator, blessed be
his name. 10.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, knows all the
actions and thoughts of human beings, as it is said: "It is he who
fashions the hearts of them all, he who notes all their deeds." (Psalm
33:15) 11.
I firmly believe that the Creator, blessed be his name, rewards
all those who keep his commands, and punishes those who transgress his
commands. 12.
I firmly believe in the coming of the Messiah; and although he may
tarry, I daily wait for his coming. 13.
I firmly believe that there will be a revival of the dead at a time
which will please the Creator, blessed and exalted be his name forever and
ever. In
the Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides used Aristotle's Metaphysics
to formulate his arguments for the existence of God. Maimonides uses
the argument from motion, the argument from efficient causes, and the
argument of from possibility and necessity. These arguments are
cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Maimonides, in
following Aristotle, has used an a posteriori method for his demonstration,
beginning with sensible things like motion and change. St. Thomas
Aquinas (1224/5 -1274)
Cosmological argument for
the existence of God "In
common with the whole Catholic tradition, Aquinas taught that the existence
of God could be philosophically demonstrated. In a famous passage [...] from
his Summa Theologica he offers five proofs,
the first of which are forms of the cosmological argument. [4th is enological
(degrees of perfection), the 5th is teleological, which are also
cosmological, and all five Ways are also a posteriori demonstrations]. The
background of the presupposition of these arguments is the Aristotelian
philosophy which had been rediscovered in Europe in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. In his Metaphysics Aristotle had argued that
change implies an ultimate source of movement; for there cannot be an
infinite regress of causes. "But if there is nothing eternal, then there
can be no becoming to be: for there must be something which undergoes the
process of becoming, that is, that from which things come to be; and the last
member of the series must be ungenerated, for the
series must start with something, because nothing can come from
nothing." (Metaphysics 999 b). This principle is employed by
Aquinas in his first three Ways, as is also the Aristotelian distinction
between potentiality and actuality." [From Copleston, History of Philosophy]
Aquinas' cosmological
argument for the existence of God Any
of the arguments for God's existence which precede
from what are regarded as observed facts about the universe, such as motion,
cause, contingency, to the conclusion that God exists as the origin and
ground for these facts. (I.e. Prime Mover, First Cause, Necessary Being).
[cosmos = universe in Greek]. The Five Ways as
in Book 1.a, 2nd question, article 3 of the Summa Theologica Can the existence of God be demonstrated? Thomas answers that he can
demonstrate the existence of God in five ways: (1)
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain,
and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now
whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved by another,
for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that which it is
moved [principle of motion]; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality
to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality,
except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot,
as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and
thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing
should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only
in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore
impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be
both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever
is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by
another and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because
then there would be no first mover, and consequently, no other mover, seeing
that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first
mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it
is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone
understands to be God. [This
is why the 1st Way is called the argument from motion] (2)
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible
things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known
(neither it is, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the
efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is
impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity,
because all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of
the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate
cause, whether the intermediate cause be several or one only. Now to take
away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first
cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any
intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to on to
infinity, there will be no first cause, neither will there be an ultimate
effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.
Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone
gives the name God.
(3)
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find
in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found
to be generated, and to be corrupted, and consequently, it is possible for
them to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for
that which can not-be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one
time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there
would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to
exist only through something already existing. Therefore, if at one time
nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have
begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence- which is
absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing
either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to
go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore
we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others
their necessity. This all men speak of as God. [Note
the law of non-contradiction (something cannot both be and not-be
simultaneously)] [From
nothing, nothing comes: ex nihilo, nihil fit] (4)
The fourth way is taken from the gradation of being to be found in things.
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. [Remember Plato?] But more or less are predicated of different things
according as they more nearly resemble in their different ways something
which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is
truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which
is most being, for those things that are greatest in being, as written in Metaph[ysics] ii.. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of
all other in that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause
of all hot things, as is said in the same book [referring to Aristotle's Metaphysics].
Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of
their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. [The
fourth Way is also called henological, which means
degrees or gradation of perfection (excellence). Also note how this
resembles Plato's Form of the Good, and how all else is only a gradation from that Form.] (5)
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things
which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is
evident from there acting always, or nearly always, in the same way so as to
obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not
fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move
towards an end, unless it be directed by some being
endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the
archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things
are directed to their end; and this being we call God. [Remember
the first line of Aristotle's Metaphysics? "All men by nature by
nature desire to know." (980 a 1) This is called natural appetite.] [God
is this pure act intellect, and is thought thinking itself] [The
Fifth Way is teleological (telos =
end in Greek) since all things strive toward the end, which is perfection, or
God. This is also called the exemplar cause, or final cause.] Note
that Aquinas has a vertical, and not a horizontal hierarchy of causation:
While
time may be seen as horizontal, and extending to infinity, cause, according
to Aquinas, cannot continue to infinity, but time is infinite. Ex nihilo, nihil fit which the meaning of "from
nothing" is "not out of anything." Something must have always
been. God is eternal, and hence is infinite. But God does not exist in this
time, space world of corruption. Time represents change, and God cannot
change. Copleston's commentary about Aquinas
confirms this: "But mention of a mathematical infinite
series is irrelevant to a discussion of his [Aquinas'] arguments. And it is a
point which I have been trying to make clear." Just because God,
as infinite, is the source of all other finite causes, is no reason to assume
that He exists in a time continuum; certainly Aquinas did not mean this what
so ever. Some criticisms of the cosmological
argument, as presented by Aquinas Cannot
know anything of cause. David
Hume (1711- 1776) in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume
discusses this critique. But even Hume did not have a good grasp of the
cosmological argument. He called it an a priori demonstration, and he thought
this, perhaps, because in contrast to the teleological argument, the
cosmological argument is actually more a priori in nature. Hume was more
concerned with the teleological argument in his Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion. The
criticism of Hume in regards to the cosmological argument is that we cannot
know anything of cause, especially not infinite cause. Hume rejects the
demonstrative proof of an existential proposition (i.e. the proposition of
the form "x exists," including "God exists"). Hume makes
a distinction between "matters of fact" and "relations between
ideas". Logical proof only applies to the latter sphere, or
"relations between ideas". For example relations between ideas are
as such: "2+2=4"; "if A is larger than B and B is larger than
C, then A is larger than C." But matters of fact about existence can
only be demonstrated empirically; for example if one cat is larger than
another can only be demonstrated by various avenues of experience, but NOT by
studying any relation of the terms involved. Relations between ideas do not
grant actuality of the ideas in reality. As
Hume puts it "there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate
a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is
demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is
distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we can conceive as
existent, we can also conceive as nonexistent. There is no being, therefore
whose nonexistence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being
whose existence is demonstrable." Hume also adds the point that even if
we could validly infer that there is a necessarily existent reality it would
not follow that this reality is anything other than the physical universe as
a whole. For this might itself be eternal and uncaused. Perhaps all beings
are merely possible beings, as our observations indicate, and necessary
beings, of any kind, do not actually exist, necessarily. Hume
was an empiricist. This is why he cannot know an essence of a thing, for this
is an intellectual report. Although the cosmological argument is causal, it
is deductive, and it is the only metaphysical argument which holds for the
demonstration for the existence of God. The arguments are sound. But for
Hume, the only valid demonstration is to show the impossibility of the
opposite (for example A is not B, and A is B presents a contradiction), but
this is a limited notion of demonstration. Essence and nature cannot be
demonstrated by empiricists. So why must rationalists accept their narrow and
limited view of demonstration? The Teleological
argument for the existence of God as presented by William Paley William
Paley (1743- 1805) was Archdeacon of Carlisle, and wrote Natural Theology
(or the Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from
the Appearances of Nature) in 1802. Definition
for teleological arguments for the existence of God: The universe as a whole
has a purpose (design, end) which was created and is sustained by God. Things
in the natural world appear to be ordered to an end. (telos = end in Greek). First
Paley starts with the watch he found upon the ground. It appears to have been
made by some designer. Why should not the stone upon the ground also have a
designer? The human eye presents a better example of natural things which
appear to be ordered for some end, because the watch was only a mere artifact
and the stone does not have an obvious order to the naked eye. The eye just
couldn't be ordered in structure that allows it to see by chance; a random
chance explanation doesn't seem plausible to Paley. Some being must have
designed the eye to enable it to function in the way that it does. God is the
designer of this order according to Paley. Criticisms of the teleological argument for
the existence of God
(1)
Just because there is an ordered purpose to things, it does not follow that
these things were created for that purpose, or that there is a creator. Paley
has made an inductive leap. The argument he presents only gets you to an
architect and not God. (2)
The world is more like a vegetable than a well designed machine. It appears
to have been made by a half-rate deity on an off-day according to Hume in his
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. We will discuss Hume's position in more detail later in the
course. The Problem of Evil is the best evidence offered against a
so-called orderly universe, and this is the evidence Hume uses. Did God not know that the world would be as
it is, or was he not powerful enough to create the best of all possible
worlds, or is it that he really isn’t benevolent after all? |
