CHAPTER 3

Quine on Analyticity

 

 

            Chapter three contains five main topics, based on Quine’s essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  First we are reminded that meaning is not naming, followed by a section which examines definition and meaning.  The third section examines how analyticity is grounded in semantic rules, and why Quine abandons analyticity.  Section four considers the radical reductionism in empiricism, and the problems with the theory of verification.  Finally the fifth section examines the conclusion to Quine’s important essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.

 

            In order to demonstrate how ontological relativity fails to explain what variables are variables of, a discussion of Quine’s view of epistemology is necessary.  The rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction is discussed in Quine’s essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  The two dogmas of empiricism are:  (1) the belief in an analytic-synthetic distinction, and (2)  the dogma of reductionism, or the belief that all statements can, in complete isolation from all the others, admit the confirmation or infirmation of all the others. [126] Quine defines analytic as “grounded in meanings independent of fact”.[127] Synthetic is the opposite or “grounded in fact”.[128] Quine defines the dogma of reductionism as: “the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.”[129]  The outcome of abandoning these dogmas of empiricism, according to Quine is two-fold:  (1)there will be a blurring between metaphysics and the natural sciences, and (2) a shift toward pragmatism. [130] Kant was not the first to make the analytic-synthetic distinction.  Leibniz had his distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.[131]  Truths of reason were true in every possible world, and not even God could change these truths.  Quine defines truths of reason as “those which could not be possibly false.”[132] What verifies such truths is that they cannot violate the law of contradiction.  Nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.  This is what an analytic statement is: a statement that cannot be denied without contradiction. Quine thinks this is a definition of very little value.[133]  Self-contradictoryness is a board notion that too needs clarification just as much as the notion of analyticity does, according to Quine.[134]  Truths of fact are verified by sense experience, and are only true if observed or true in this actual world (the best of all possible worlds). Synthetic judgments are judgments which cannot not be verified without sense experience to legitimate them. Truth is a synthesis of the understanding of the meaning of the terms used and verification of the states of affairs they describe as being the case in reality.  The truth of synthetic statements is contingent upon reality, and analytic statements are necessarily independent of reference to sense data, and are sometimes called tautological since they are always true. 

 

            Hume called this distinction relations between ideas and matters of fact.[135]  This is sometimes called Hume’s fork.  Relations between ideas are also verified by the law of contradiction, and are necessary.  Only the relation between the ideas in the judgment are examined.  Matters of fact are verified by sense experience, and hence are contingent upon being true in the world or fact.  Kant made the distinction between the analytic (necessary, independent of sense experience) and the synthetic (contingent, dependent upon sense experience).  Descartes had too made such a distinction before him.  An analytic statement is a statement in which the predicate term is contained in the subject term, or as Quine defines it: “one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject.” [136]

 

 

 

MEANING IS NOT NAMING

 

            Quine reminds us that meaning is not naming.[137]  There are several illustrations of the fact that “terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning.” [138]  Consider the following example.  While driving down an unfamiliar road while a passenger is giving directions, the driver may ask for clarification:  “Turn left?”  The passenger responds by exclaiming “Right!” So what is the driver to do;  should the driver turn right, or is the left turn in fact correct?  Such semantic ambiguity is common among words that are the same, but have different meanings.   Quine is refering to another kind of ambiguity.  An example is the age old confusion of the morning star and the evening star as two separate objects, when in fact the different terms refer to the same object, the planet Venus.  Sure enough, the morning star is there in the early morning, and the evening star in the evening, but to think that they are two separate objects is the true confusion.  Being both the morning star and the evening star is true of the planet Venus.  General terms, or predicates, whether they be concrete or abstract, such terms do not name entities, but are “true of” an entity according to Quine. [139]  The example that “9” and “the number of planets” name the same abstract thing, but are not at all similar in meaning. [140]  This can not be solved using an analytic process, according to Quine, since empirical evidence is needed to show that there are in fact 9 planets in our solar system.  “The class of all entities of which a general term is true is called the extension.” [141] Extension is the set of all things to which the general term applies.  There is a parallel, Quine continues, between the meaning of a singular term, and the entity it is to name, and the meaning of a general term, and the class of all things to which the general term applies (extension). [142]  The confusion of meaning with general terms is not as typical as confusion of meaning with singular terms.[143]  It is, Quine contends, typical to reject intension (connotation) for extension (denotation), like Ockham had.[144]  Quine notes how the essentialism of Aristotle led to the modern notion of intension.[145]  Aristotle thought that there were essential qualities that made a thing the kind of thing that it is.[146]  Accidental qualities in contrast are qualities which are not necessary to make an thing a thing that it is.  Aristotle thought that man was essentially a rational animal.  This essentialism of Aristotle is different from meaning Quine points out.[147]  “Things have essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings.  Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.”[148]  This is no longer a question about things, but of meanings.  “[W]hat sort of things are meanings?”[149]  First Quine points out that meaning and reference are distinct from one another.[150]  The theory of meaning depends on the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements. [151] But, Quine sees no validity in synonymy nor analyticity, and hence he says that meanings ought to all together be abandoned. [152]  He examines the problem of analyticity.

 

            Analytical statements fall into two classes according to Quine;  the first class is called “logically true” and the second class of analytical statements depend on the notion of “synonymy,” which Quine thinks also needs clarification. [153]  An example of a first class analytical statement is, according to Quine, “No unmarried man is married.” [154]  This statement, Quine contends, is logically true, or “remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles.”[155] The subject term contains a double negation and the predicate an affirmation of the same term. He describes unmarried man in this way since he doubts the synonymy of unmarried man with bachelor.  Hence, there is this other class, the second class, and Quine uses the example following for an analytical second class statement: “No bachelor is married.” [156]  The second class uses synonyms, which are logically containing the same information, but Quine seems skeptical.[157]  Some languages may lack synonym pairs, and for such languages, Carnap appealed to what he called “state-descriptions”.[158]   In such languages “No bachelor is married” is a synthetic statement.[159]  “Analyticity serves its purpose only if the atomic statements of the language are [...] mutually independent.”[160]  If truth were assigned to both “John is married” and “John is a bachelor” then “No bachelor is married” becomes a synthetic statement.  This example of the second class depends heavily upon the notion of synonymy.[161]  Such an example would violate the law of non-contradiction if such qualities were essential to John’s being John.  John cannot be both a bachelor and married at the same time.  Quine is certain that “not not married” is synonymous with “married”, but does not think that “not bachelor” is synonymous with “married”.

 

 

DEFINITION AND MEANING

 

            Since definitions rely on synonymy, Quine brings his attention to them.  The first class of analytical statements relied upon definitions. Quine’s first example is:

(1)  “A bachelor is an unmarried man.”

 “A bachelor is an unmarried man” is a definition of bachelor.  Hence an unmarried man is both a necessary condition (this is a necessary condition for that if and only if that cannot be without this) and sufficient condition (this is a sufficient condition for that if and only if this alone can guarantee that) for being a bachelor.  That is how definitions are supposed to work, if the synonymy is real.  “[R]eport of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy.”[162] Quine thinks that the criteria for determining synonymy is not at all clear, but synonymy is nonetheless granted in the conventional use of language.[163]  These conventions are established by usage.   But such usage has already been rejected for grounds for accepting the synonymy.

 

            Explication is not synonymy, since it aims to aid in the understanding of the definiendum, and is not just merely an outright repetition.  But no matter, most all

definitions, with rare exception, rely on prior notions of synonymy.[164]  Definitions did not help with the understanding of the grounds for synonymy.  Hence, Quine leaves that,

and moves on to discuss interchangeability.[165] Interchangeability is the ability to exchange two linguistic forms for one another without any change of truth

value. [166] Quine explains that Leibniz called this salva veritate.[167]  This in no way eliminates vagueness, since the linguistic forms may be synonymous in their

vagueness.[168]   Quine contends to demonstrate that all synonyms are not interchangeable salva veritate. He easily has many options to replace with bachelor, but his example is

“‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.”[169] It is quite apparent that ‘bachelor’ and ‘less than ten letters’ is not going to be salva veritate.  However Quine is not playing fair.  The lack

of interchangability is due to his using denoting (is true of) instead of connotation. 

           

            Assuming once again that analyticity is possible Quine offers another example:

(2)  “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.”[170]

This is to be a criterion for a cognitively synonymous statement, and it is salva veritate, in which the truth is saved.  Quine is looking for an account of analyticity which does not

depend on prior synonymy. Is this a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy, the interchangeability of bachelors and unmarried men, as in the statement: “All and only

bachelors are unmarried men.”[171]  If that will not convince, perhaps the next example will finally shed light on the grounds of analyticity:

(3)   “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.”

  “[S]upposing necessarily [is] so narrowly construed as to be truly applicable only to analytic statements.”[172]  The resulting sentence, assuming salva veritate would be:

(4)  “Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men.”[173] 

To claim that “Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true is to say

that:

(5)  “Necessarily all and only unmarried men are bachelors”

 is true and this would make “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” an analytic statement, and that bachelors and unmarried men are synonymous.[174]  But Quine

contends that a deception has gone on here.[175]  I had a student in one of my logic classes claim that her boyfriend was not a bachelor and he was an unmarried man.  This seems to

pose a problem for the analyticity of bachelor with unmarried man.  This example is not really a fair use of the term bachelor, since bachelors are indeed necessarily unmarried

men.  But what of the married man that acts as if he is a bachelor or lives the life of the playboy. Does such a person make it impossible of there to be certainty in the meanings

of our terms?  Surely he is married;  ask his wife if she thinks he is both married and at the same time a bachelor.  He is just playing the part, and is not in fact truly a bachelor as

bachelor are.

            The above statement supposes we are working with a language rich enough to contain the adverb ‘necessarily’, this adverb being so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to an analytical statement. But can we condone a language which contains such an adverb?  Does the adverb really make sense?[176]

 

The only way to make sense of the adverb ‘necessarily’ is to already understand the grounds for the notion of analyticity, which have not as yet been determined to Quine’s

satisfaction. Quine thinks that the above argument is circular.[177]  To admit some prior grounds for synonymy is to admit to a priori knowledge, something Quine is not willing

here it appeal to.  Quine  gives an example of an extensional language to make his point. He makes a language using one place predicates (F, where Fx means x is a man); many

place predicates (Gxy, where Gxy means x loves y); atomic sentences which can be composed of one or more variables (‘x’, ‘y’, etc.), and atomic functions (‘not’, ‘and’,

or’, etc.).[178]  “Now a language of this type is extensional, in the sense:  any two predicates which agree extensionally (that is, are true of the same objects) are

interchangeable salva veritate.”[179]

 

            In such languages, there is no certainty that synonymy will hold for the type as desired, and there is no reliance upon meaning when it comes to random matters of

fact.[180]  Quine thinks that appeal to cognitive synonymy was wrong, though it did explain the analyticity of “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.”[181]  Cognitive synonymy

also works for many-place and one-place predicates.[182]  Quine concludes that singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when it is a statement of identity using

an equivalence (p = q).[183] And finally, Quine abandons salva veritate (rooted in de re necessity) for an interchangeability of his own salva analyticitate (rooted in descriptive

phrases). [184]

 

 

THE GROUNDING OF ANALYTICITY IN SEMANTIC RULES

 

            Quine abandons the discussion of definition and meaning and focuses on analyticity, since its grounding is at the source of the issue. 

 

            Analyticity at first seemed most naturally definable by appear to a realm of meanings. On refinement, the appeal to meanings gave way to an appeal to synonymy or definition. But definition turned out to be a will-o-the-wisp, and synonymy turned out to be best understood by dint of prior appeal to analyticity itself. [185]

 

Quine questions if the statement ‘Everything green is extended’ is actually analytic. [186] This is an example of a de re necessity, that to have color, an object must be

extended. Quine explains this confusion is not because he fails to understand the meaning of green or extended, but he is not sure what analytic means. [187]  Quine claims that in

ordinary language it is difficult to always differentiate analytic statements from synthetic statements because of the vagueness of ordinary language. But artificial languages can be

constructed, which follow “semantical rules” which are supposed to eliminate any confusion and vagueness. [188] An example of what such a rule does is place conditions

upon statements S, in language L, that require they be analytic.[189] “[T]he problem is to make sense of this relation generally, that is, for variable ‘S’ and ‘L’.” [190]  What does it

mean that S is analytic for L, and limiting the bounds of L does not eliminate the vagueness.  Any such “semantic rule” which contains the term ‘analytic’ is not

meaningful because it is not yet clear what being analytic for any language means. “[T]he rules contain the word ‘analytic’ which we do not understand!” S is only analytic to

language L, but what is this ‘analytic for’ relation?  How are we to determine the relation if analyticity is not understood?  Quine attempts to dump the word ‘analytic’ for a term,

K. [191] Hence this would be “S is only K to L”.  But Quine even acknowledges that this only will lead to an understanding of what the relation of S is to K, but not what K-ness is

in and of itself. Once again, analyticity, according to Quine, had eluded clarification. 

 

            Quine examines another class of “semantic rules” which simply include what have been called analytic statements among the class of truths.  It does not imply

anything about interchangeability.  Such a rule would specify what characteristics statements must have in order to be classified as truths.  Hence the statement is not

analytic because it is necessarily true, but is a truth because it adheres to the “semantic rules of truths” and this makes it analytic. [192]               

 

            Not every true statement which say that the statements of some class are true can count as a semantical rule--  otherwise all truths would be “analytic” in the sense of being true according to semantic rules.  Semantical rules are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on a page under the heading ‘Semantical Rules’;  and this heading is itself then meaningless.[193]

 

 

Although it appeared that the second class of analytical statement which adhere to “semantical rules of truth” did not at all shed light upon what analyticity means,  because

the rules themselves are meaningless.  Quine then compares semantic rules to postulates.[194]  Semantical rules are meaningful, if they are seen as postulates Quine

contends.  “[I]f conceived in a similarly relative spirit-- relative, this time, to one or another particular enterprise of schooling unconversant persons in sufficient conditions

for  truth of statements of some natural or artificial language L.”[195]  If this was the case, Quine informs, then no semantical truth would exclude any other. ‘Brutus killed Caesar’

would have a different meaning entirely if killed has another meaning, such as begat. [196] “Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow

analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.”[197]  This is from where the false acceptance of the analytic-synthetic distinction arises, and then it is acceptable

to find that analytical statements are factually null.[198]  But Quine does not think a clear boundary between analytical statements and synthetical statements has been

demonstrated.  “That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of the empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.”[199]  Why empiricists have

accepted this a priori notion, which Quine calls mere faith, is quite beyond him, an Quine is not willing to accept the distinction.

 

            Since Quine had set aside the question of meaning earlier, he returns to it now.  “[W]hat [...] of the verification theory of meaning?” Quine asks. [200]  The verification

theory of meaning is “the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it.  An analytic statement is that limiting case which is confirmed

no matter what.” [201]  Hence, usually empirical evidence is used to support or verify meaning, but with analytical statements, since they are true regardless of empirical

evidence, are not verified in this way.  In reference to synonomy, it can now be said that two statements are synonymous is and only if they are verified by empirical confirmation

or infirmation.[202] Quine notes that this is not a comparison of linguistic forms but of statements, but from the concept of synonymy of statements, the synonymy of other

linguistic forms could be similarly defined. [203]  “So if the verification theory can be accepted as an adequate account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is

saved after all.” [204]  But Quine does not accept the theory of verification.  What set of empirical criteria demonstrates that two statements are in fact synonymous? “What, in

other words, is the nature of the relation between  a statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from it confirmation?” [205]  This leads question leads Quine to

examine the nature of radical reductionism in empiricism. 

 

 

RADICAL REDUCTIONISM IN EMPIRICISM AND THE PROBLEMS WITH THE

THEORY OF VERIFICATION

 

            Radical reductionism is the view that “[e]very meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate  experience.” [206]  This notion

of radical reductionism is something that empiricists Locke and Hume held.  Locke and Hume thought that knowledge was acquired after sense experience, and hence all simple

ideas could be traced back to simple impressions as their source.  Simple impressions were fleeting immediate sense experiences, and simple ideas are fainter copies of

impressions in imagination.  Complex ideas are compounds of simple ideas.  Hume found that he could legitimate no ideas in this manner, since the bundles of perception

prevented him from tracing simple ideas back to their simple impressions as their source. Hume realized the difficulty with such a reductionism.  Quine acknowledges this by

saying:  “the doctrine remains ambiguous as between sense data and sensory events and sense data as sensory qualities; it remains vague as to the admissible ways of

compounding.” [207] Compounds are made out of simples, but it quite possible to create compounds of simples that have nothing to do with reality.  Since ideas are fainter copies

of impressions in imagination, it cannot be determined if any of our ideas are really correct in describing the world.  The true problem of the theory of verification is in its

blind acceptance of such an reductionism, since such empiricists only try to match words to sense-datum, and not the entire sentence in question.  This is a type of reductionism

that Quine does not find tolerable.  Quine wants the entire sentence to be translated into sense-datum language. [208] Quine fails to recognize that descriptions do not solve the

problem.  Quine thinks that Locke and Hume would welcome this acceptance of the sentences as the significant units rather than the words. [209]  “This reorientation whereby

the primary vehicle of meaning came to be seen no longer in the term but in the statement.” [210] This is an important shift in the verification of meaning, and now it is the

sentences which must be verified by sense experience.  Carnap tried to translate significant discourse into a sense-datum verified language. [211] Carnap did not start with a

sense datum language, because his language included notions of logic and set theory. [212]  Carnap was able to define some sensory concepts with his system, and:  “[h]e was the

first empiricist who, not content with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction.”[213]

 Carnap had not seen that such system, even of the most basic statements, could not clearly show that they were true about the world.[214] Because of this vagueness, Carnap’s

theory cannot be used to show that our ideas do match the world, but Carnap did show that it is statements, and not words that have to face up to the scrutiny of empirical

verification. 

 

THE TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM

 

            The two dogmas of empiricism:  (1) the analytic synthetical distinction, and (2) the dogma of reductionism, are in fact two aspects of the same dogma, since at root the

dogmas are identical. [215]

 

            We lately reflected that in general the truth of statements does obviously depend both upon language and upon extralinguistic fact; and we noted that this obvious circumstance carries in its train, not logically but all too naturally, a feeling that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.  The factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to a range of confirmatory experiences. In the extreme case where the linguistic component is all that matters, a true statement is analytic.[216]

 

Quine thinks that true empiricists would require the verification of statements using sense-data.  But there is still this so-called false notion of analyticity and syntheticity of

 statements according to empiricists, but even so, there still seems to be the existence of statements that do not require sense-data for verification, but can be verified using the linguistic component

alone.  So it seems that Quine wants to eliminate the analytic-synthetic distinction, but still insists on making the verified by sense-data or verified by linguistic

component distinction that is at the root of the analytic-synthetic distinction. I have long thought that there was a false dualism  regarding the analytic-synthetic distinction. 

But empiricists tend to favor the sense-datum verification, while rationalists favor the linguistical verification, neither is willing to admit that the other form of verification

 does not exist or is not meaningful. Hence there are always bound to be linguistically verified statements in any empirical theory, as well as empirically verified statements in any

 rationalistic theory.  Quine hopes that his discussion has shown that the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been shown to be a distinction which is hard to make in a

clear, distinct way.[217]  Quine thinks the real problem is in thinking that there is this division between the linguistical component and the factual component of individual statements. [218]

Science is dependent on both language and experience and it is this belief of some dualistic nature of statements has made some favor the empirical rather than the linguistic component,

since science has statements that seem to not reflect this duality, science may think that it is free of the dilemma. [219] Quine notes that words were too narrow for verification, and so are mere

statements.  “The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.” But we must bracket in some way to make verifications.  Postulates are a form of convention.  Logic is

must rest on a convention.  But this convention cannot be merely definitional, since definitions do not found truths, only transform them.  Quine would not accept a type of

conventionalization of analytical definitions, that make them merely conventionally necessarily true.[220] 

 

            Quine defines science as being like “a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience.” [221]  Science is bound with sense-datum verification.  There has to be a

method of determining truth value, and such values range over statements.  Quine takes a pragmatic approach to truth in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  “Truth values have to

redistributed over some of our statements.  Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because their logical interconnections-- the logical laws being in

turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field.”[222] But experience is not bound by determined boundaries, and it is difficult to

know what to reevaluate and in light of what evidence.  It is clear that particular statements cannot be traced back to particular experiences, in the same way that simple ideas could

not be traced back to simple impressions.  All we can do is to take a pragmatic approach,  and “accept indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.”[223] 

Hence all the statements make a field, and each statement is evaluated, and reevaluated again, and is judged according as it best fits into our system of beliefs.  No statement is immune

 to revision. [224]  And what of the abstract entities of mathematics? 

“Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in degree to which they expedite our

dealings with sense experiences.” [225] Hence ontological concerns are on the same level as questions of science and mathematics.  It is important to the natural sciences to find a

conceptual framework.  The only real way to make a distinction between ontological concerns and scientific concerns is by maintaining the distinction between analytic and

synthetic.  Quine wants to eliminate such a distinction it seems without eliminating the factual component of verification nor the linguistic component of verification.  What he

is not in favor of is a reductionism of one kind of statements to another.  So how can this factual-linguistic distinction be eliminated, or at least, how can there be two ways of

verification if there is not a analytic-synthetic distinction?  Linguistically verified statements are not required to be verified by sense experience, and hence the dichotomy

cannot be neatly reduced to a singular type of verification. Perhaps understanding the us of predication, the possibility of reification may be made more clear.



 

[126]            From A Logical Point Of View, 41.



 

[127]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 20.

 

[128]            Ibid.

 

[129]            Ibid.

 

[130]            Ibid.

 

[131]            Monadology #33, 258.

 

[132]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,  20.

 

[133]            Ibid.

 

[134]            Ibid.

 

[135]            Enquiries, page 25. (Book 1, section 4, part 1, 20).

 

[136]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 20-21.

 

[137]            Also see sections 37, 41, and 42 in Word and Object for more about this point.  Although Quine abandons singular terms and names here, he reparsed names later in his career.

 

[138]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 21.

 

[139]            Ibid.

 

[140]            Ibid.

 

[141]            Ibid.

 

[142]            Ibid.

 

[143]            Ibid.

 

[144]            Ibid.  Remember Quine prefers to call denoting ‘is true of’. Methods of Logic, 94.

 

[145]            Ibid.

 

[146]            Metaphysics, 1015 B - 1016 A.

 

[147]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,  22.  Quine is mistaken about Aristotle’s view.  According to Aristotle, the subject was part of what ousia (what it was to be or quid erat esse) means, and this entails using linguistic forms that have meanings.  The formal cause includes the definition (as well as the shape and form).  Metaphysics 1010 A  - 1013 A, and Categories 5.

 

[148]            Ibid.

 

[149]            Ibid.  Meanings are things.  Linguistic forms have essences.  Quine is in fact setting up a kind of essentialism much like Aristotle’s (see Posterior Analytics).

 

[150]            Ibid.

 

[151]            Ibid.

 

[152]            Ibid.

 

[153]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 22-23.

 

[154]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 22. 

 

[155]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 23.

 

[156]            Ibid.

 

[157]            Ibid.

 

[158]            Ibid.

 

[159]            Ibid.

 

[160]            Ibid.  Or, they are not defined in terms of each other.  This is close to Descartes’ definition of substance, as that which can be conceived alone.

 

[161]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 24.

 

[162]            Ibid.

 

[163]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 25.

 

[164]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 27.

 

 

[165]            For more about this see Word and Object, sections 13 and 14; and Methods of Logic, 63.

 

[166]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 27.

 

[167]            Ibid.

 

[168]            Ibid.

 

[169]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 28.

 

[170]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 29.

 

[171]            Ibid.

 

[172]            Ibid.  

 

[173]            Ibid.   

 

[174]            Ibid.

 

[175]            Ibid.

 

[176]            Ibid.

 

[177]            The argument is circular.  “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 30.

 

[178]         Ibid.

 

[179]            Ibid. For more about logical connections see section 13 of Word and Object.

 

[180]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 31.

 

[181]            Ibid. 

 

[182]            Ibid.

 

[183]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 32.

 

[184]            Ibid. For more about synonymy see page 47 of Word and Object and page 76 of Pursuit of Truth.

 

[185]            Ibid.

 

[186]            Ibid.

 

[187]            Ibid.

 

[188]            Ibid.

 

[189]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 33.

 

[190]            Ibid.

 

[191]            Ibid.

 

[192]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 34.  Quine has totally missed the point here.  He acknowledges that semantic rules are merely arbitrary, but thinks that necessity, if there is any, is based on adherence to such rules, and this is where the notion of analyticity comes from.  The semanitic rules require necessity, hence he has put the cart before the horse.  An example of such a rule is that analyticity requires that the predicate term of a proposition be contained with its subject.  Quine needs to attack de dicto necessity, and not merely just de re necessitiy.

 

[193]            Ibid.

 

[194]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 35.

 

[195]            Ibid.

 

[196]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 36.

 

[197]            Ibid.

 

[198]            Ibid.

 

[199]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 37.

 

[200]            Ibid.

 

[201]            Ibid.

 

[202]            Ibid.

 

[203]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” page 38.

 

[204]            Ibid.

 

 

[205]            Ibid.

 

[206]            Ibid.

 

 

[207]            Ibid.

 

[208]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 39.

 

[209]            Ibid.

 

[210]            Ibid.

 

[211]            Ibid.

 

[212]            Ibid.

 

[213]            Ibid.

 

[214]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 40.

 

[215]            “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 41.

 

[216]            Ibid.

 

[217]            For more about the stimulus analytic see pages 67-68 of Word and Object (and sections 14-15).

 

[218]             “Two Dogmas Of Empiricism,” 42.

 

[219]            Ibid. 

 

[220]            Ways of Paradox, “Truth by Convention,” 88.

 

[221]            Ibid.

 

[222]            Ibid.

 

[223]            Ibid. Quine abandons the pragmatic approach for the coherence approach in Word and Object and Web of Belief. For more about this see Word and Object, page 23, and Pursuit of Truth pages 33, 79, 134-135.

 

[224]            Ibid.

 

[225]            Ibid.