CHAPTER 2
QUINE ON ONtolOGY
This chapter
will examine four ontological topics.
First to be examined is Quine’s distinction between meaning and naming,
followed by a discusion of the differences between realism, conceptualism, and
formalism. The third topic examined is
the distinction between phenomenalism and physicalism. The fourth section briefly examines four
kinds of nominalism: predicate, concept,
class, and resemblance.
In his
essay, “On What There Is”, Quine begins by establishing a list of things which
do not grant the existence of an universal
concept. First singular terms can be
used without entailing the existence of an entity named. Second, general terms or descriptions can be
used without entailing that these words refer to abstract entities. Third, claims of synonymy can be made without
the entailment of some realm of meaning.
Quine does not use empirical evidence to develop his categories; they
seem to come to him innately. Quine also
discussed the limit to the range of a bound variable, and concedes that to be
is not to be the value of a bound variable.[15]
He also described realism, conceptualism, and formalism in terms of what each
would permit a bound variable to range over, and Quine found nominalism to be
the most suitable of the ontological views, yet he did not discuss this view,
but he employed it implicitly. He then
explains the difference between phenomenalistic conceptual schemes and
physicalistic conceptual schemes, seeming to favor physicalistic schemes over
phenomenological ones, but in the end of this essay claims that the
phenomenological conceptual scheme takes epistemological priority. [16] Quine does abandon phenomenalism by the time of
Word and Object in 1960.
Ontology is the study of being, or
what it means to be. Ontology is a study
of essence, not existence. An important issue in the study of ontology is
whether or not universals exist. Quine
addresses this issue in “On What There Is”. He begins by asking the basic
ontological question “What is there”? [17] Quine argues that no one would disagree that
the answer to the question is “everything,” but this a vague answer.[18] What is this everything that is? If two people disagree on an ontological
issue one would have to affirm that something is the case, while the other
denies that something is the case. “It
would appear that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side
suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees
with him.” [19] This forces the
proponent of the negative side to posit that which the proponent claims does
not exist as that which is not. Quine goes on to mention that this is
the old dilemma created by Plato of non-being.
According to Quine, there must be something which is non-being, or
something which is not in contrast to that which is.[20]
This leads philosophers to “mistaken” points of view, that even Pegasus exists,
or to “impute being where they might otherwise be quite content to recognize
that there is nothing.”[21] Because we know that a being must be a
certain kind, it does not follow that there needs be an existing being of that
kind. Quine is correct in making his
distinction between actual and imaginary, but in doing so, he is not shifting
the discussion towards existence. He is not concerned with there being an
actual object existing, but merely a possible object. An object is a thing of a certain kind if
there is a being that has such and such attributes, but there need not be any
such object.
The
epistemological distinction between concept and object, when the referent is actual, is clear. Yet
in the case of concepts which do not refer to actual objects, such as Pegasus,
Quine argues that it is necessary to say that there is something which is
not. In order to escape this dilemma,
and to separate himself from realistic philosophers, Quine uses the copula ‘is’
without the existence predication.[22]
Quine echoes Kant’s criticism, of the ontological argument, as applied to the
existence of God, that existence is not a real predicate.[23] Hence Quine has concluded that using terms
like “Pegasus” does not in fact presuppose an existent being that is being
named by that term. “Russell, in his
theory of so-called singular descriptions, showed clearly how we might
meaningfully use seeming names without supposing that there be entities
allegedly named.”[24]
Quine calls these “so-called singular descriptions” because such descriptions
usually are phrases which describe, and not singular terms.
[T]he burden of objective reference which had been put
upon the descriptive phrase is now taken over by words of the kind logicians
call bound variables, variables of quanification namely, words like
‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’. [...] These quantificational words or
bound variables are, of course a basic part of language, and their meaningfulness, at
least in context, is not to be challenged.[25]
Bound variables now replace descriptive phrases, and are
functional because they are more general.
Hence we can use more general terms, and they as well as other terms,
need not imply the existence some entity.
So it can be
said that “the round square cupola on Berkeley College is not” is a descriptive
phrase that does not refer to some actual entity.[26] “Now what of ‘Pegasus’?
This being a word rather than a descriptive phrase, Russell’s argument does not
immediately apply to it.”[27] All we have to do, Quine continues, is to
substitute a phrase for the singular term, that is
synonymous with the singular term. The
singular term must be translated into a description.[28] Russell had come up with a solution to
Plato’s paradox with his theory of descriptions, and Quine acknowledges his
acceptance of it as well.[29] Quine states in Word and Object:
It is the difference, so central to Russell’s philosophy,
between description and acquaintance. It
is kept before us in synchronic behavior as a difference between the
non-observable occasion sentences, with their random variation in stimulus from speaker to speaker, and
observational sentences with their socially `uniform stimulus meanings. [30]
What if the singular term was an obscure term? Would a description like
“the thing that is-Pegasus” lead to the contention that universals exist?
Quine thinks not. “If in terms of
pegasizing we can interpret the noun ‘Pegasus’ as a description subject to
Russell’s theory of descriptions, then we have disposed of the old notion that
Pegasus cannot be said not to be without presupposing that in some sense Pegasus
is.” [31] Quine has stated that descriptions for
singular terms do not imply that there is a being to which the description
refers in existence.
Quine
describes the accepting of the existence of entities in “Plato’s heaven” as non
sequitur, and that he is not interested in non-being or being of
universals.[32] To
posit universals would be to create a bloated universe as far as Quine is
concerned.[33]
MEANING AND NAMING
The
existence of universals, or the existence of
attributes or categories based on like objects all having something in common,
is merely trivially true for Quine.[34] He notes that one’s ontology is fundamental
to formulating an epistemology or ‘conceptual scheme’.[35]
Unfortunately, Quine does not define ‘conceptual scheme’.[36] Ontological statements need no justification
because they are basic and important for understanding our conceptual
schemes. “One’s ontology is basic to the
conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace
ones. Judged within some particular
conceptual scheme -- and how else is judgment possible? -- an ontological
statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at
all.”[37]
In “Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis” Quine describes his
pragmatic approach to ontology as a type of ontological relativism. “Concepts are language, and the purpose of
language, and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in
communication and in predication. Such
is the ultimate duty of language, science, and philosophy, and it is in
relation to that duty that a conceptual scheme has finally to be appraised.”[38] When a conceptual scheme that multiplies
entities beyond necessity to use Ockham’s razor, or is “too unwidely for our
poor minds to cope with effectively” in Quine’ terms, then “elegance is simply
a means to the end of a pragmatically acceptable conceptual scheme. But elegance also enters as an end in itself
-- and quite properly so as long as it remains secondary in another respect;
namely, as long as it is appealed to only in choices where the pragmatic
standard prescribes no contrary decision.
Where elegance doesn’t matter, we may and shall, as poet, pursue
elegance for elegance’s sake.”[39] Simplicity and elegance as means to an end
echoes Kant once again. Quine states how
we must see ontology as basic to conceptual schemes, and all judging is from
within such a scheme.
He also
notes the difference between meaning and naming.[40] Meaning is conceptual, or mind
dependent. Meanings explain what a thing
would need to be if it were of the kind in question. It does not, he contends, imply that there is
a named or actual entity that exhibits theses qualities.[41] Quine claims that it is the confusion of
meaning with naming which induces philosophers to acknowledge the existence of
universals. He is also claiming that it is this confusion of between meaning
and naming that leads to belief in universal concepts.
There is a gulf between meaning and naming even in the
case of a singular term, which is
genuinely a name of an object. The following example from Frege will
serve. The phrase “Evening Star” names a
certain large physical object of spherical
form, which is hurling through space some scores of millions of miles from here.
The phrase “Morning Star” names the same thing[.]
[...] But the two phrases cannot be regarded as having the same meaning[.] The meaning, then, being different from one another, must be other than the
named object, which is one in the same in both cases.[42]
Those that hold that universals exist have confused meaning
with the named object, according to Quine, and what they have mistakenly called
universals are actually attributes. Just because there are red houses and red
sunsets, Quine in no way thinks that this leads to the affirmation of the existence
of red-ness. The way he avoids the
universal is to reject meaning, or the intensional meaning. Quine seems to only
be rejecting intensional meaning, since he thinks there a
confusion between meaning and naming.[43] “[T]he only way I know how to counter it is
by refusing to admit meaning.”[44] It does not follow that Quine thinks that
words and statements are not meaningful.
Quine considers the reliance upon definitions to convey meaning is a reliance upon an illusion.[45] Does one have to admit to the existence of
universals merely because some meanings are synonymous? Quine offers, of course, the negative answer
to this question.
Quine has
not abandoned meaning. He wants to
ensure that the confusion between meaning and naming will be eliminated, and
this can be accomplished if meaning is restricted to extensional meaning. Intensional meaning is the set of
characteristics a thing must have to be named the thing that it is. In contrast, extensional meaning is the set
of things to which the definition applies, and involves the naming of things
that fit the meaning or characteristics of the class (class concepts). He wants
to ban intensional objects by using extension instead.[46]
Quine is not
referring to actual, physical entities with his naming. He is referring to variables. Ontological committal descriptions are the
kind to which Quine wants to apply his bound variables. Quine contends that names are easily
converted into descriptions, but what of the bound variable? [47] Quine says that the use of the bound variable
is the only situation in which ontological commitments are involved.[48]
We could change the name, or eliminate them all together: “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and
simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.”[49] This answers the question of being: “that to
be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun.”[50]
He will say a few pages later: “To be is
be the value of a variable.” This results in an indeterminacy of
translation. There are no such things as non-relative
facts. Quine contends that use of bound variables in
ontology will not explain what there is, but about what one believes to be what
is. Perhaps all we can know is our
beliefs about what that object or other is, but not the this
(or its essence). This is not a claim about existence, but about language and
belief.
Objective truth is not possible given Quine’s
usage of ontological relativity.
Variables are bound in the scope of a quantifier. Statement functions use bound quantifiers; such statements
have variables that are all abound within the scope of the same quantifier. [51] Quine defines pronoun as “the basic media of reference.”[52]
Bound variables like ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’ are included in
ontologies, and the existence of such ranging variables does not necessary
imply the existence of the entities being described. Quine believes that: “[W]e are convicted of a particular
ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presupposition has to
be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to
render one of our affirmations true.”[53]
Quine offers an example to illustrate his point
To accept the presupposition ‘Some dogs are white’ is true there has to
be at least some actual dogs that are in fact white, hence the bound variable
‘something’ ranges over actual entities if this is the case. This bound variable, or the use of the
existential quantifier, in no way forces him to accept or admit that there is
some entity of ‘whiteness’ or dogness, Quine contends. Only if there are some
white dogs, the presupposition ‘Some dogs are white’ is true. He in no way wished to commit to the
existence or being of abstract entities.
REALISM, CONCEPTUALISM, AND FORMALISM
Quine
believes we now have a clear standard to determine the truth of
presuppositions, or “an implicit standard whereby to decide what ontology a
given theory or form of discourse is committed to: a theory is committed to those and only those
entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of
referring in order that the affirmation made in the theory be true.” [54] This brings Quine to the descriptions of
possible ontological theories, or “points of view” that had been debated in
medieval philosophy and were now entering into discussions among modern
mathematicians.[55] The
debate among the modern mathematicians, Quine relates, is this: to what extent
do the bound variables actually range over entities, or what range of entities
is acceptable for bound variable reference? [56]
Quine
defines realism, conceptualism, and formalism to illustrate their similarity
with modern mathematical positions of logicism, intuitionism, and formalism for
various answers to the question of the reference of bound variables. [57] Realism is, according to Quine: “the Platonic doctrine that universals or
abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover
them but cannot create them.”[58] Realism as conceived by Aristotle still
maintained that we could only know our perceptions of the world, and not the
independent objects (composite of matter and form or hylomporphic composition)
existing in the natural world as they truly are. Plato, an idealist, made the knowledge of
essence even more difficult by separating matter from essence (or form).[59] This is mirrored in the Logicism of Frege,
Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap.[60]
“Logicism [is t]he view
pioneered by Frege and Russell, that received mathematics, in particular
arithmetic, is part of logic. The aim
was to provide a system of
primitives and axioms (which on interpretation yielded logical
truths) such that all arithmetical notions were definable in the system and all
theorems of arithmetic were theorems of the system. If successful, the program would ensure that
our knowledge of mathematical truths was of the same status as logical truths.”[61]
He claims that Ockham, a medieval nominalist, had his razor
dulled by cutting through the unnecessary entities of Plato’s universe.[62] A nominalist is one that denies the existence
of forms or universals. Nominalists call forms as merely names; universals are
only to be found in predicatations in our language-making Nominalism is the view that universals do not
have an independent existence but are merely names.[63] Quine is a nominalist. Quine makes no secret
of his disagreement with Plato.[64] Plato accepted the existence of universals
separate from the things of the sensible world.
Of course, this is what Quine is denying. As realist, Aristotle, differed on the
“location” of the universals, claiming that to be known the forms must be
immanent in the matter of which they are forms, or hylomorphic
composition. Universals are abstracted
from particulars. Nonetheless, this is still an affirmation of a class or group
of essential entities, separate from the mind, and hence, realism. The
logicians accept “the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities
known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately.”[65]
Quine will not tolerate this use of bound variables
ranging over possible instead of actual entities. The entities must be known to determine
whether the bound variables accurately range over them. Being known and determinate is not just a
mere concept but a reference to something real known by our senses. This kind of reference or verification cannot
be done with abstract entities, especially unknown entities of any kind. An example of such a mathematical abstract
entity is n + 1. The natural number
series could not continue without the potentiality of n + 1 (in example 1 + 1 =
2; 2 + 1 = 3; 3 + 1...) There cannot be 2 without 1. The existence of such a continual series is
not known a posteriori, but only a priori, and is a mathematical
concept. But is there a concept of 1 which itself exists? Do universals exist as separate
entities? Quine does not think that
universal or abstract terms have an existence.
Conceptualism
is, according to Quine, the view that “there are universals but they are mind
made.”[66]
“Conceptualism [is t]he theory of universals according to which general or
abstract terms (such as ‘substance’ or ‘humanity’) have meaning because they
name or otherwise refer to corresponding non-physical entities, called
concepts. In the most substantial, and
perhaps least plausible view, these concepts are taken to be mental images.”[67] According to Quine, sense experience and language are interwoven and
cannot be separated from each other.
Language is an expression of thoughts in the “mind”. The mind is not a collection of separate
things, each with its separate empirical definition.[68]
There is not a separate mind, according to Quine, where thoughts, in any form,
exist independent from experience. Nor
can experience exist independent of what is thought about it.
Conceptualism
is in opposition to realism because the conceptualists hold that universals or
concepts are mind made, while the realists do not think that universals are
mind made, or mind dependent, since universals are abstracted from the Forms
that are present in the objects in Aristotle’s view. Intuitionism is the modern view similar to
Conceptualism. Of their range of acceptance of bound
variables referring to abstract objects Quine states: “only when those entities
are capable of being cooked up individually from the ingredients specified in
advance.”[69]
Intuitionism [is a] system produced by Brouwer, identifying truth with being known to be true, that is, proven. The main theses of intuitionism are: that a mathematical entity exists only if a constructive existence proof can be given; and that a (mathematical) statement is true only if there is proof of it, and false only if a proof of its denial can be given. Brouwer’s idealist inclinations led him to describe mathematics as investigation of the (ideal) mathematician’s “mental constructions”.
The view is notable for its
rejection of classical logic, and in particular the law of double negation, the law of
the excluded middle,
and the classical reductio [ad absurdum].[70]
The opposition between realists and conceptionalists is not a
mere “quibble”. The position one takes
will influence one’s view of mathematics and in particular one’s view of the
levels of infinity.[71] Realists have orders of infinity that are
ascending, while conceptualists do not go beyond the first level of infinity,
or lowest order of infinity, and in effect abandon classical mathematical laws
regarding real numbers.[72]
Formalism
is, according to Quine,
“the unbridled recourse to universals.” [73] The Formalists are much like nominalists, in
that they do not admit to the existence of universals in the way that realists
and even the conceptualists do, but nonetheless cling to them for safety. We need not throw out mathematical principles
like the conceptualists, but the formalists admit to the existence of abstract
entities, and this is something conceptualists do not recognize. The rules that govern mathematical systems
need only be examined and this can serve as an adequate basis of agreement
among individuals of any ontological following:
“[T]hese syntactical rules being, unlike the notions themselves, quite
significant and intelligible.” [74]
From this statement, Quine attempts to find a suitable ontology among the
options, but he asks: “[H]ow are we to
adjudicate among rival ontologies?” [75]
Perhaps we need not abandon all elements of an old theory of ontology to
establish a new one, “[i]f the new theory can be so fashioned as to diverge
from the old only in ways that are undetectable in the most ordinary circumstances,
then it inherits the evidence of the old theory rather than having to overcome
it. Such is the force of conservatism
even in the context of revolution.”[76] It cannot be accomplished by using “To be is the value of a variable”, a
mere semantic formula. [77]
Quine notes that we are not trying to discover what there is, but what someone
else says there is. [78] Hence, according to Quine, we can only know
our beliefs about the world, and not the world in and of itself. Our beliefs about the world are changing. The web of beliefs is constantly being
examined and reexamined. When it is
discovered that a belief no longer suits our uses, it is changed or discarded. Things cannot be known in and of themselves; all we know are the
predicates in our language-making.
Hence the only possible ontology is ontological relativism. We cannot look merely to the bound variable
to find the ontological standard, since the bound variables must be verified to
actually range over the entities they bound over, in conformity to a
pre-existing ontological standard. [79]
This has been a semantical discussion in the debate over what there is; there
was the predicament of not being able to admit that there are disagreements,
and the side of the opponent was disadvantaged.
Quine hopes that the collapse or reduction of this debate into a debate
over words may eliminate any question-begging. [80] Is this a mere debate of words? It seems the reliance upon an empirical sense
field theory from which our perceptions of the world are obtained ensures such a relativity. This
kind of relativity leads to the inability to hold one theory as better at
explaining the nature of reality than another -- there could always be another
paradigm shift. Ontological relativity
would, Quine hoped, end mere quibbles over words, but it has not. This reminds
me of a passage in Through the Looking-Glass where Alice is told by
Humpty Dumpty, after a discussion of un-birthday presents that are given 364
days a year opposed to once a year for birthday presents, “there’s glory for
you!”.[81] Alice replies that she is not sure what he
means by glory. “Of course you don’t--
till I tell you. I meant ‘there is a
nice knock-down argument for you!’” Humpty Dumpty retorts.
But glory does not mean ‘a nice knock down argument’,”
Alice objected. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more
or less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make
words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty,
“which is to be the master--- that’s all.[82]
Hence if such ontological relativity is permitted, words can
mean just about anything an individual likes.
If this is the case, Philosophy has not progressed beyond the ideology
of Protagoras and his homo mensura.
Too bad the king did not really mean that all his horses and all his men
could really put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Therein lies the
problem. If ontology,
and thus meaning of words can be relative, no one will be sure of what anyone
else is really trying to express anymore.
Hence, Quine attempts to ground his relativity with the physical
sciences. Due to the
fact that the physical sciences are themselves in a state of constant change,
and revision, constantly shifting meanings within its theoretical statement
making. Quine has tried to ground
the relative in the relative. In Quine's
view, we should be the master of words in our conception-making. Thus, we should only agree to those concepts
that fit into a set of true beliefs about the world, supposedly gained from
mere sense stimuli:
Our acceptance of an ontology
is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say
a system of physics: we adopt, as least
insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the
disorded fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged’.[83]
Our sense experiences must be organized; raw experience has
to be arranged into a conceptual scheme.
Quine again employs the notion of a ‘conceptual scheme’ and the simpler
the better. Like Ockham, Quine sees no
reason to violate the doctrine that entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter
necessitatem. Unlike Ockham, Quine
found no reason to ground meaning in some sort of universality. Quine wants to
ground his ontological relativity in the physical sciences, yet his
nominalistic view of reality does not leave room for physical entities.
PHENOMENALISM AND PHYSICALISM
Phenomenological conceptual schemes are
epistemological, while physicalistic conceptual schemes (based in
material-epiphenomenalism) are “physically fundamental”.[84]
Phenomenological schemes do not claim to know substance, as it is noumenal or
beyond appearance. All that can be known about the world is how it
appears. Physicalists do make a claim
about substance, that it is material, or that
causation all takes place within a material substance. Hence phenomenalism and physicalism are
contrary positions.
Quine spends
little time discussing the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme. This
epistemological dualist scheme admits a distinction between analytic
statements, in which the predicate term is contained in the subject term, and
the synthetic term, in which the predicate information cannot be known to apply
to the subject without verification from sense experience. Examples of
phenomenalistic conceptual schemes are found in the schemes of Hume and
Kant. Quine abandoned the
analytic-synthetic distinction as well as challenged the concept of necessity. He asks: “Which should prevail?” [85] If we eliminate the analytic-synthetic
distinction, then it is not yet clear which type of statements should
prevail. Should analytic statements
prevail or should synthetic statements prevail?
Quine does not see how analytic propositions can be verified as true,
and he thinks that only synthetic propositions have this quality. Do they really? It would appear that synthetic propositions
or matters of fact, fall short of such
verification.
Quine says of the physicalistic
conceptual scheme, since it claims to talk about external objects, that it
“offers great advantages in simplifying our over-all reports. By bringing together scattered sense events
and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce the complexity of our
stream of experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity.”[86] This rule is a counter-Humean rule. Hume wanted all simple ideas to be traced
back to simple impressions as their source.[87] Hume defines the distinction between
impressions and idea in his A Treatise of Human Nature:
All
the impressions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,
which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS.
The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and
liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our
thought and consciousness. Those
perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may call impressions;
and under the name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as
they make their first appearance in the soul.
By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and
reasoning; such as, for instance, all the perceptions excited by the present
discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch and excepting
the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.[88]
Impressions and ideas can be divided
into the simple and the complex.[89] All simple ideas must be traced to simple
impressions as their source. Hume states
this principle in his Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding: "When we entertain, therefore, any
suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as
is too frequent), we need but inquire, from what impressions is that
supposed idea derived?" [90] However, the bundles of perception inhibited
the ability to find these simples, since a collection of experiences masks the
individual impressions that led to the idea.
Quine seems to find these bundles simplifying, while Hume thought them
to be the leveling of knowledge both of matters of fact and relations between
ideas. It seems unclear how conceptual
schemes can be simplifying. Quine explains the rule of simplicity as: “[O]ur guiding maxim in assigning sense data
to objects: we associate an earlier and
later round of sense
datum with the so-called name penny, or with two different so-called pennies,
in obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world picture” [91] For the sake of simplicity, we assign
names to sense data, and when we see objects which exhibit the standard named,
we use same name for each. It matters
not if the penny in my pocket is not the same as the penny I had last
weekend. It is a penny none the less.
Of phenomenological and physicalistic
conceptual schemes, both have advantages. He appreciated that phenomenalism
only admits to knowing things as we believe them to be due to their
appearances. All that is known about
reality is that which appears. In phenomenalism,
search for essence, and substance is not possible,
since essential qualities and substance are hidden behind the veil of
appearance. While using a phenomenalistic view, there was no need for Quine to
commit to anything beyond appearance.
Quine later rejects the phenomenological view for the concrete objects
of physicalism, as physics demands. The physical sciences deal with actual
physical entities, and not just the mere appearance of those entities. Most of the important entities of the
physical sciences don't always appear to the unaided human eye. Quine eventually finds an advantage in the
physicalistic conceptual scheme because it brings together “scattered sense
events” that are linked to “so-called” objects.[92] Does it really? If the objects in question
are too small, or elemental, Quine does not consider them to be concrete
objects, although such objects are the bread and butter of the physical
sciences. Hence the advantage of the
physical sciences seems to be diminished by Quine's limitation.
Quine, of course, is not optimistic
that it is possible to convert
phenomenological conceptual schemes into
physicalistic conceptual schemes.[93] “Now what of classes or
attributes of physical objects, in turn?” Quine recognizes that for the
phenomenologist, the physicalistic conceptual scheme is as much myth or
superstition, as the phenomenological conceptual scheme is to physicalists. Can
we know the attributes of objects via either schema?
In his
conclusion to “On What There Is,” Quine wants to see how far the reduction of a
physicalistic conceptual scheme will fit into a phenomenalistic conceptual
scheme.[94] Quine wants to have mathematics free of
Platonic myth, but at the same time inquires into its Platonic foundations.[95] Quine claims that the phenomenalistic
conceptual scheme is best able to handle the job, and it also takes what he
calls “epistemological priority,” since it only claims to know objects as they
appear and not the substance.[96] Quine believed this because the
phenomenological conceptual scheme is willing to admit that “ontologies of
physical objects and mathematical objects are myths.”[97] Myth has a relative quality. Each
epistemological point of view is one among several points of view, each of
which correspond to different interests and ends.[98]
Hence Quine adopts and practices an ontological relativity.[99] The question of “on what there is” does not
refer to what there is in existence, but what we experience, and hence all we
can know is about what there is.
. Theories can
take yet more drastic turns: such not merely to threaten a cherished ontology
of elementary particles, but to threaten the very sense of the ontological
question what there is. What I have been
taking as the standard idiom for existential purposes, namely quantification,
can serve as a standard only when embedded in the standard form of regimented
language that we have been picturing:
one whose apparatus consists only of truth functions and predicates. If there is any deviation in this further
apparatus, then there arises a questions of foreign
exchange: we cannot judge what existential
content may be added by these foreign intrusions until we have settled on how
to translate it all into our standard form.
[...] A kindred notion may then stand
forth that seems sufficiently akin to warrant application of the same word;
such is the way of terminology. Whether to say at that point that we have gained new insight into
existence, or that we have outgrown the notion and reapplied the term, is a
question of terminology as well.[100]
Relativity
is to be overcome by the use of a first order logical language. If the terms can be defined and consent is
established, then truth can be established within the system. There could be quibbles over the meaning of
words. Without anything but our
impressions of the world to guide defining, might there be difference in
opinion over the meaning of terms, as in Through the Looking Glass? However, mere quibbles over
shades of meaning is not the true difficulty. There are beliefs that cannot be translated
into this logical syntax
Are such beliefs meaningless because they do not fit the system
or is the system merely inadequate to account for such experience? It is difficult to convert our sentiment and
beliefs into a concrete logical syntax.[101] There would be different kinds of beliefs for
different believers, and such difference may be overlooked, or complicate
understanding the meaning conveyed by the terms all together. Quine contends that we do not have the
ability to know if things exist, only our perceptions. The relativity of
perceptions makes it difficult to understand what the terms truly mean. Hence not only is Quine unable to know the
things themselves, it seems that he is unable to explain the meaning of
linguistic terms within a set web of beliefs.
This relativity is a result of a lack of universal understanding of the
essential qualities that make a thing a certain kind of thing, and it is this
essence that is being described by language.
Without acknowledgement of essential qualities which are a necessity to
describe kinds of things, all descriptions, as well as things themselves, seem
to be ambiguous.
Quine is willing to use a theory that
has efficacy, and utility, and it seems that physicalism and nominalism are
those theories. It too seems that the
claim of the physicalists that matter is real is a bit strong a position for a
nominalist to take. What the realists
call “forms” are merely names according to nominalists. Essence or form is essential (primary) substance
or ousia. Ousia is best
defined as quid erat esse, or what it was to be. Nominalism comes from the Latin word nominalis
which means name, so nominalism is literally name-ism. So what is real? Most nominalists like to remain substance
neutral, but Quine favors a type of physicalism in his later philosophy.
“Closeness of association with stimulation has stood up poorly as an argument for giving physical objects preferential status. But something could still perhaps be salvaged from it. For, grant that the question whether to dignify given words as terms is a question of what was said earlier for physical objects, viz. that terms for them are fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation, perhaps we could say this: sentences fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation exhibit terms for physical objects in all sorts of term positions, not just in rather special positions. It seems plausible that common terms for physical objects come out better by such a standard than abstract terms do.” [102]
Some do not even like to discuss matters of ontology in terms
of existence of universal concepts like formal essences. The only existence
nominalists will grant is the existence of particulars. Today, talk of particulars has been changed
to talk about objects. Quine groups
objects into kinds: “[i]n general we can take it as a very special mark of the
maturity of a branch of science that it no longer needs an irreducible notion
of similarity and kind.”[103] However, the manner in which we identify
these objects is not agreed upon by nominalists either.
FOUR KINDS OF NOMINALISM:
PREDICATE, CONCEPT, CLASS, AND RESEMBLANCE
Nominalism,
in general, is the view that universals do not exist, but that only particulars
exist. All forms of nominalism share
this basic premise. Quine makes a major
shift in his philosophy. At first he
criticizes nominalism, but in his later philosophy embraces the view. Quine in fact is criticizing other forms of
nominalism in favor of another. Hence a
discussion of the some of the main kinds of nominalism is essential to
understanding Quine’s view. The
limitations of predicate, concept and class will be illustrated as to shed
light upon why Quine favors resemblance nominalism. Presently, Quine favors a nominalistic
approach by holding the view that universals are not real, and do not have an
existence what so ever. Universals are
only to be used as predicates. He does
not appear to favor the view here in “On What There is,”
and in Word and Object makes a claim against nominalism.
Let a word therefore, have occurred as a fragment of ever
so many empirically well-attested sentential wholes; even as a rather termlike
fragment, by superficial appearances.
Still, the question whether to treat it as a term is the question
whether to give it general access to positions appropriate to general terms, or
perhaps to singular terms, subject to the usual laws of such contexts. Whether
to do so may reasonably be decided by considerations of systematic efficacy, utility theory. But if
nominalism and realism are to be adjudicated on such grounds, nominalism’s
claims dwindle. The reason for admitting
numbers as objects is precisely their efficacy in organizing and expediting the
sciences. The reason for admitting to
classes is much the same.[104]
All nominalists claim that what
realists call universals are in fact merely names. There are several forms of nominalism,
including predicate nominalism, concept nominalism, class nominalism and
resemblance nominalism. Nominalists think that the realists have gone to far in positing an existence of essences, or universals
merely based on the word “is”. This word
is merely a copula, or linking verb, and in no way can imply the existence of
something, since it is not a real predicate.[105] The predicate adds no new information and
predicates must predicate of something.
Kant uses this in his Critique of Pure Reason as a criticism of
ontological arguments for the existence of God.
The word “is” added no new information than we had already had in the
subject to begin with, hence “is” is not a real predicate.
Ockham had one of the earliest
criticisms of realists like Plato and Aristotle, although he was not the first
nominalist. Ockham denies that there
could be some existence of essence separate from the individual that contains
that essence. Essences could not apply
to more than one thing, since each thing is an individual or particular.
“In
an individual, there is no universal nature really distinct from a contracting
difference. Such a nature could not be
posited there unless it were an essential part of the
individual itself. But there is always a
relation between whole and part such that, if the whole is singular and not
common, then analogously each part in the
same way is singular. For one part
cannot be more singular than another. Therefore, either no part of the individual is
singular or every part of the individual is singular. But not no part. Therefore every part. Likewise, if two such really distinct factors were in the individual, does
it not seem to involve a contradiction that one could be without the other. In that case,
the individual degree could be without the contracted nature or conversely,
which is absurd.” [106]
If this is the case universals do not exist, only individuals. Every part of
every individual is singular, or a particular, and in no way universal. Ockham
is famous for his anti-realistic stance. He first called universals, ficta,
or entities that only have intensional being.
Ockham later abandoned intensional being, and identified what realists
call universals with the acts of understanding.[107] All nominalists are not of the Ockham
variety, and there are several forms of nominalism today. Predicate nominalism, concept nominalism,
class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism are all forms of nominalism
discussed in this section. All forms of
nominalism have a fundamental belief that universals do not exist, but are
merely names.
The first form of nominalism to be
discussed is predicate nominalism.
Predicate nomimalists, link general terms, predicates, to the
subjects to which they apply. These
predications are not universals, but merely names or qualities or attributes of
a subject. The predicate is said to be
true of the particular, but philosophers like Armstrong think this to be
misleading, since the predicate nominalist has not verified this using an
objective process. How can we be certain
that these predicates are in fact true of the particular we apply it to?[108] Since there can be many interpretations of
the sense fields of empirical experience via which empirical nominalists gain
their knowledge of the world, it is impossible to even objectively know the
world as it is. The predicate
nominalists use a method of analysis like:
“A has property F if and only if a falls under the
predication F”.[109] But since there is no way to verify this
application empirically (a posteriori) or rationally (a priori),
how can we be so certain? This does not eliminates nominalism, since predicate nominalism is only
one type.
The second
form of nominalism is concept nominalism.
Concept nominalism is a lot like conceptualism, in that these nominalists use
concepts. This is very much like the predicate nominalism just discussed. They even use the same method of analysis as
the predicate nominalists: “A has property F if and only if a
falls under the predication F”.[110] Armstrong goes on to state that since
predicate and concept nominalisms are so close in relation, one criticism could
be used to attack both effectively. The
problem is with the concepts used as predicates. What is whiteness? Can one definition suffice? Can we employ an axiom that all things
similar to this thing is a white thing? What does white mean? This is an infinite regress much like the one
posed by Plato’s separation of matter from form. Will the term be applied by all individuals
universally in the same way? An empiricist may be tempted to show whiteness to
another to prove its meaning -- but what allows the empiricist to bracket a
determination of whiteness at that time?
Can that bracketing apply to all situations of whiteness? It is hardly likely. And furthermore, can
predicates be taken to be real properties? It does not seem possible that such
concepts can be accurate predications of real particulars since, as it has been
said before, there are no objective means to verify predication using empirical
means absent universal essences.
Class
nominalism is a third type of nominalism which attempts to class group
particulars into categories of similarity.
Many, like Quine, consider this type of nominalism to be
self-contradictory.[111] If we have really abandoned Plato and his
realism then what are we using abstract entities for anyway? Armstrong
dismisses Quine’s criticism, and includes class nominalism as a real type of
nominalism. Class nominalists use this
method of analysis: “A has
property, F, if and only if A is a member of the class of F’s.”[112] The problem arises in class nominalism in a
case where classes are identical only if they have identical members, such as F
and G, which have identical members.
But this violates the rule given to us by the class nominalists, since
the class of F is identical to the class of G. This is even more problematic if F and
G are empty sets, and hence refer to the same (non)
set of entities.[113] F and G would have every
property, identically, and hence why make a distinction between F’s and G’s
in the first place? What does it really mean to “be a member of” a class?
What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken
absolutely is not universality but circularity.
A question of the form “What is an F?” can be answered only by
recourse to a further term: “An F
is a G.” The answer makes only
relative sense: sense relative to the
uncritical acceptance of “G”.[114]
Quine acknowledges that there is no way to answer the dilemma
of the third man - what is a G?
He thinks that it must be uncritically accepted since “G” is
without possible definition. “All G’s
are X”. “What is an X?” is
the next question. These are circular
definitions and it is never clear what G is. Leibniz, in his
Monadology was well aware of this difficulty and came up with his principle
of indiscernibles. “For
there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it
is not possible to find a difference either internal or based on intrinsic
property.”[115] There must be a difference between every G
and every X or there would not be the distinction of G-ness and X-ness
perceived in the first place.[116]
Resemblance nominalism
is the fourth type of nominalism to be discussed in this paper. The type of analysis used is this: “A has the property F, if and
only if A suitably resembles a paradigm case (or paradigm cases) of an F.”[117] Quine calls such test cases “foils”.
Without serious loss of accuracy we can assume that there
are one or more actual things (paradigm cases) that nicely exemplify the
desired norm, and one or more actual things (foils) that deviate just
barely too much to be counted into the desired kind at all, then our definition
is easy: the kind with paradigm a and
foil b is the set of all the things to with a is more similar than a
is to b. More generally, then
a set may be said to be a kind if and only if there are a and b, known or
unknown, such that the set is the kind with paradigm a and foil b[118]
So, if we can compare the particular to its other kinds, then
we can fit it into a group of others which resemble it. Quine claims we learn how to make this fit by
ostension .[119]
Hume states of resemblance: “that every
passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, acquires new
force and vigor.”[120] We will learn how to fit the members into
groups to which they resemble, by trial and error,
Quine uses a
mixture of verification and falsification, but the foil, too, needs to be
verified as being the foil. Armstrong
thinks that finding truth by trial and error is more of a statement of the
problem of nominalism rather than a solution.[121] Resemblance nominalism is no better than
class nominalism, and in fact it contains all the same difficulties. What does resemblance really mean? How far can we apply the resemblance? Cannot all particulars resemble all others in
that they are all particulars? This is
not very informative. White cannot, according
to Armstrong, be an essence like a Platonic form, nor is it just a mental
concept.[122]
Nominalists do not pretend to know
anything beyond the particulars or objects they observe. But because of the relativity of sense data,
and the lack of an absolute interpretation of sensations, it is not clear how a
nominalist like Quine can know particulars at all. Most empiricists admit that all that is
knowable is these perceptions and not that which the perceptions are about, the
objects in and of themselves. It is due
to Quine’s view of resemblance nominalism that he seeks to favor the
phenomenalistic conceptual scheme in the end of “On What There Is.”[123] He does this, because, in order to check our
logical claims, to determine the extents to which bound variables apply, the
nominialistic view is that what can be bound by a variable, must be rooted in
the qualities of the objects being observed.
How else can we know things except by way of “raw experience”?[124] That is all that is real, according to Quine
-- objects. He resorts to physicalism over phenomenalism.[125] Using the principle of simplicity, the actual
qualities of the actual objects could be quantified by bound variables. Such a
principle relies on the notion of synonymy.
Quine cannot demonstrate that he knows the things in the world are as
they are, and hence his use of sense fields and ontological relativity makes it
impossible to know that by which variables are bound.
At
first Quine seems to be a phenomenalist, holding the position in his earliest years, that things cannot be know themselves. Only the appearances seem to be
knowable. This fits Quine’s early view
of nominalism, especially his resemblance nominalism. Things are kinds of the same type if they are
more like each other than they differ.
Phenomenalism was selected rather than physicalism, it seems, since
physicalism does make a claim about things as they really are. Things are physical, or made out of matter. Typically matter is seen a substance. Some claim that even the physical is a mere
appearance, and thus there is not a conflict between phenomenalism, and
physicalism. I beg to differ. It must be the case that there are
fundamental differences between the two positions, otherwise they would be
distinctions without a difference. There
is a major distinction between phenomenalism and physicalism: the distinction is that phenomenal does not
pretend to know that which transcends appearance, while physicalism does. The physical existence of things is not mere
appearance, but a quality that goes beyond appearance. The basic building blocks of matter,
subatomic particles, are beyond appearance when using only the human eye, yet
we know they exist by other means, such as electron microscopes. There exists
something beyond the mere appearance of things.
Quine does not abandon his nominalistic position when he
makes his shift to physicalism in his later philosophy. This seems very inconsistent. Nominalism claims that things are merely
names, and not universals, and not physical entities. It is imporant to recognize this contrast in
his early and later views regarding ontology.
Where before he was not going to favor either physicalism, nor
conceptualism or realism, language and sense experience were interconnected and
could not be independent of one another.
We had no more understanding about one or the other.
[15] “On What There Is,” W.V.O. Quine, From A Logical Point Of View, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 15
[18] Ibid. Jaakko Hintikka remarks of this response given by Quine, that ‘everything’ is a response only an universalist can give. “For a universalist, there is only one range for one’s (first order) quantifiers, viz., all the individual objects in the world. It is for such reasons that Quine has been concerned with the unification of universes even in his technical logical theory and has argued that there is basically only one sense of existence.” Jaakko Hintikka, “Quine As A Member Of The Tradition” as in Perspectives on Quine, Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, editors, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), page 164.
[19] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 2.
[22] Ibid., 3.
[23] Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by JMD Meiklejohn, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 335. “Now if I take the subject (God) with all the predications (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predications-- I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object-- in the expression, it is-- as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars.”
[24] Ibid., 5. Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1994), 51. Russell defines his singular-descriptions: “Thus if ‘C’ is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity x (there cannot be more than one) for which the proposition ‘x is identical with C’ is true, this proposition being interpreted as above. We may then say that the entity x is the denotation of the pharse ‘C’.”
[25] Ibid., 6-7.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid. I think that Quine employs the use of Russell’s theory of descriptions. There is considerable controversy over the theory of descriptions. Strawson agrees with me, and also notes that singular-descriptions will in effect eliminate singular terms. Peter Strawson, Individuals, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 195.
Russell uses the theory of types, which refers to classes, to escape the paradox. The problem is that some classes are members of themselves. This results in a contradiction. Is R a member of itself? If it is a member of itself it belongs to the class of all classes that are members of themselves. If it is not a member of itself it belongs to the class of all classes that are not members of themselves. So either way, it still is a member of itself. To remedy this problem, Russell describes his theory for a gradation of types, in his essay “Mathematical Logic as Based on a Theory of Types.” “‘Whatever contains an apparent variable must not be a possible value of that variable.’ Thus whatever contains an apparent variable must be of a different type from the possilbe values of that variable; we will say that it is of a higher type. Thus the apparent variables contained in an expression are what determines its type. [...] The terms of elementary propositions we will call individuals; these form the first level or lowest type. [...] Elementary propositions together with such as contain only individuals as apparent variables we will call first-order propositions. These form the second logical type. We thus have a new totality, that of first-order propositions. We can thus form new propositons in which first-order propositions occur as apparent variables. These we will call second-order propositions; these form the third logical type.” Logic and Knowledge, 75-76.
Russell defines the difference between description and acquaintance in his Problems of Philosophy. Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), page 46. “Knowledge of things by description, always involves, [...] some knowledge of truths as its source or ground.” On the other hand knowledge of things by acquaintance does not require knowing any such
truths. He goes on to define acquaintance as “anything of which we are directly aware without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.” To describe a table is to note certain truths about tables.
[30] W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1960), section 13: “Translation and Meaning,” 56. In section 12, 53 Quine states: “We cannot even say what native locutions to count as analogues of terms as we know them, much less equate them with ours term for term, except as we have also decided what native devices to view as doing in their various ways the work of our own various auxiliaries to objective reference: our articles and pronouns, our singular and plural, our copula, our identity predicate.” In section 20, “Predication” Quine goes on to explain that terms like ‘Pegasus’ are learned by description. (page 95).
[36] “Word and Object,” 3. Quine discusses conceptual schemes in “Word and Object.” “There is every reason to inquire into the sensory or stimulatory background of ordinary talk of physical things. This mistake comes only in seeking an implicit sub-basement of conceptualization, or of language. Conceptualization on any considerable scale is inseparable from language, and our ordinary language of physical things is about as basic as language gets.”
[37] “On What There Is,” 10.
[38] W.V.O. Quine, From A Logical Point Of View, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 79.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Of this Orestein remarks: “Thus, singular existentials such as ‘Quine exists’, were said to be meaningless because the string ‘($x) Quine’ is not well formed. Fortunately fashions have changed. Strawson has reminded us how much names are like descriptions (Strawson 1963).” Alex Orestein, “Is Existence...?” as in Perspectives on Quine, Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, editors, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 266.
[41] “On What There Is,” 9. Quine contends that it is a moot point. Quine is not concerned with proving that his definition of meaning is correct, but in showing how those that accept the existence of universals have misunderstood the difference between meaning and naming. Named objects are not merely conceptual. Accordingly, meanings are not, on their own, evidence for the existence of a namable (actual) entities.
[42] Ibid. Kripke agrees with Quine on this point, and thinks that such truths are contingent, and not necessary. “But neither of those are necessary truths even if that’s the way we pick out the planet. These are the contingent marks by which we identify a certain planet and give it a name.” Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 105.
[43] From A Logical Point Of View, 139 -159. Intensional objects can be quantified over by bound variables, if they are analytically equivalent. Quine rejects the notion of analyticity in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” An analytical judgment is a judgment in which the predicate term contains no more information than the subject term. The predicate is synonymous with the subject.
[44] “On What There Is,” 11. In “Word and Object,” Quine explains about intension: “One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intensional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second. To accept intentional usage at face value is, we say, to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions.” 221. Quine is not interested in connotation, but denotation. Quine prefers ‘is true of’ to the usage of ‘denoting’. Sometimes extensional meaning is described as denoting, while intensional meaning is described as connotation. Quine explains: “The phrase ‘is true of’ is less open to misunderstanding; clearly ‘wicked’ is not true of the quality of wickedness, nor the class of wicked persons, but of each wicked person individually.” W.V. Quine, Methods of Logic, Fourth Edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 94.
[47] Naming and Necessity, 27. “Frege specifically said that such a description gave the sense of the name.” Names that do not stand for descriptions don’t have any sense.
[55] Ibid.
[58] Ibid., 14. “Realism [is the view] (in scholastic philosophy [...] contrasted with nominalism) that universals have a real and substantial existence, independently of being thought. [...] Most commonly the view (contrasted with idealism) that physical objects exist independently of being perceived. Thus understood, realism obviously reaffirms the standpoint of common sense.”
[61] A Dictionary of Philosophy, 215. But arithmetic was lowered to the realm of set theory.
[64] “On What There Is,” 5. “I have spoken disparagingly of Plato’s beard, and hinted that it is tangled.” And it is this “inconvenience” of “putting” up with Plato’s theory that led Quine to develop his own ontology.
[68] W. V. Quine, Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Revised Edition, (Cambridge: University of Harvard Press, 1976), “On Mental Entities,” 221.
[75] Ibid.
[76] W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, Second Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1970), 76.
[80] Ibid., 16.
[81] Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking-Glass, (New York: Bantam Classic, 1988), 168-169.
[87] Hume, “A Treatise of Human Nature,” in Philosophers Speak for Themselves: Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, edited by T.V. Smith and Marjorie Grene, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 106-107.
[88] Ibid. Hume also defines these terms in his Enquires Concerning Human Understanding (Book 1, section 2, 12.)
[89] “[...] I must make use of the distinction, of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and many of our complex impressions are never exactly copied into ideas.” “Treatise,” 108.
[90] David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, revised third edition, P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 22.
[91] “On What There Is,” 17. Quine explains the rule of simplicity as: “[O]ur guiding maxim in assigning sense data to objects: we associate an earlier and later round of sense datum with the so-called name penny, or with two different so-called pennies, in obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world picture”
[95] Ibid.
[99] W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other essays, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 138.
[101] Wittgenstein comments in Philosophical Grammar, that there is nothing to be gained by using the Russellian notation $x. “Ordinary language says “In this square there is a red circle”; the Russellian notation says “There is an object which is red circle in this square.” [...] Perhaps even the expression “there is” is misleading.” page 267. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rhees, (Berkeley: University of California Press), 266-267.
[103] “Natural Kinds,” 138. See Metaphysics 1015 a. “Nature is styled the substance of things that exist by Nature; [...] metaphorically speaking and generally, every substance is called Nature, also is a certain substance.” Naming and Necessity, 127. Kripke defines natural kinds as being like proper names, and applies this view to mass terms such as gold and water.
[105] Bertrand Russell, “The Existential Import of Propositions,” The Collected Dialogues, Volume 4: Foundations of Logic 1903-1905. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
[106] William of Ockham “Five Questions on Universals” Paul Vincent Spade (translator and editor), Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 152.
[108] D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 13.
[111] Ibid. Quine believes that: “[t]hey [set theorists] treat of no distinctive objects and indiscriminately of all.” Methods of Logic, fourth edition, 302.
[113] Armstrong, 35-36.
[116] Donald Davidson and J. Hintikka, Word and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), 260. Berry’s essay “Logic With Platonism” explains the “Platonistic interpretations of G.” G here is ‘the best grand logic.’ Berry asks: “How then do we find out about this realm of extra-mental, non-particular, unobservable entities? Our knowledge of them, like our knowledge of the extra-mental, unobservable objects of the physical sciences, is indirect, being tied to perceived things by a fragile web of theory.”
[123] Quine notes how the formalistic mathematical scheme was the one to which he subscribed in "On What There Is," 18. The discovery of Russell’s paradox and other contradictions arose in set theory and became a challenge to Quine and his resemblance nominalism, and he notes how “[t]hese contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive, ad hoc devices; our mathematical myth making became deliberate and evident to all.” So, Quine, a nominalist was not free from myth as he admits, since he adopted the myths of mathematics and physics.
[125] Perspectives on Quine, 322. Quine’s view is described as a kind of physicalism and epiphenomenalism by Barry Stroud in his essay “Quine’s Physicalism.” The use of proxy functions will ensure that the dualistic dilemma of the separation of mind and the physical [solipsism] is avoided. Stoud also describes Quine’s sense field theory on page 323.